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Taiwan president calls for 'meaningful dialogue' with China 

Taiwan president calls for 'meaningful dialogue' with China  | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Reuters

‘Speaking at National Day celebrations, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen described the situation in the Taiwan Strait as “quite tense.” ’

  • ‘This, along with disputes in the South China Sea, a China-India border conflict and China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, showed democracy and peace in the region were facing big challenges, she said.’

‘Tsai said she was committed to maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, but that this was the responsibility of both sides.’

  • ‘Still, she has made strengthening Taiwan’s armed forces a priority, and said she would keep pushing this, upholding the principle of neither seeking war nor fearing it.’
  • ‘ “Our commitment to our sovereignty and democratic values will not change, but we will also maintain strategic flexibility and be responsive to changes,” she said.’
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'In City Where China Welcomed the World, Xi Prepares for a Colder One'  

The New York Times

Chris Buckley | The New York Times

‘Mr. Xi’s visit to Shenzhen did not signal any shift from his established economic course.’

‘When China first opened to overseas investors, the country was desperate for foreign technology to revive its growth.’

  • ‘Now, as China faces rising global barriers, its leader, Xi Jinping, is urging greater domestic innovation.’

‘Mr. Xi delivered this message on Wednesday, October 14, while making an anniversary pilgrimage to the southern city of Shenzhen, which in 1980 was established as a “special economic zone” next to the global financial hub of Hong Kong.’

  • ‘Shenzhen quickly became an incubator for “reform and opening up,” the strategy championed by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping that paved the way for the country’s decades-long economic takeoff.’

‘Mr. Xi’s speech in Shenzhen gave a likely preview of a Communist Party leaders’ meeting late this month, when he will lay out China’s economic strategy for the next five years, including harnessing more domestic innovation and consumer spending.’

‘Mr. Xi pledged to make Shenzhen a proving ground for upgrading China’s economy and strengthening innovation, citing plans to step up spending on technology research.’

  • He stressed Shenzhen’s importance in a regional economic initiative that also encompasses Hong Kong, a strategy that could enhance Chinese influence over the former British colony and underscore its reduced importance for Beijing.’

‘ “This is a new spin using Shenzhen to say, ‘We can be economically strong, we can be technologically innovative, we can be socially progressive, on Chinese terms,” ’ said Juan Du of the University of Hong Kong.’

  • ‘ “A lot is riding on this for Shenzhen to be able to set an example for other cities in China,” she said.’
  • ‘ “Shenzhen’s importance to the national psyche is far greater than just its economic importance.” ’

‘Mr. Xi’s visit to Shenzhen did not signal any shift from his established economic course, said Deng Yuwen, a former editor for a party newspaper who now lives in the United States.’

  • ‘ “I think the propaganda pitch has been set this high this time to try to shift the outside world’s view saying that China is not reforming and is closing itself off,” Mr. Deng said by telephone.’
  • ‘ “Oftentimes, what action you take is not the same thing as in the propaganda.”
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Early Warning Brief: Beijing Raises Shenzhen’s Status at the Expense of Hong Kong

Early Warning Brief: Beijing Raises Shenzhen’s Status at the Expense of Hong Kong | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

The Jamestown Foundation

Willy Wo-Lap Lam | The Jamestown Foundation

‘Xi’s speech also carries immense significance for the development of the entire Pearl River Delta, now usually referred to as the “Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area” (粤港澳大湾区), or GBA.’

‘Xi’s speech also carries immense significance for the development of the entire Pearl River Delta, now usually referred to as the “Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area” (粤港澳大湾区), or GBA.’

  • ‘Consisting of Hong Kong, Macau, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Huizhou, and four other Guangdong cities, the GBA is supposed to spearhead the growth—particularly in high technology, finance, and the service sectors—of all of southern China.’

‘Even though Shenzhen’s GDP surpassed Hong Kong two years ago, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)—which is China’s only international financial center with close business connections with most Western countries—has always been regarded as the dragon head of this region (Hong Kong Economic Times, October 16; Gov.HK, August 27).’

  • ‘In his Shenzhen speech, Xi designated the SEZ as an “important engine” for GBA development.’
  • ‘In the Plan, Shenzhen was even eulogized as “the core engine” for growth in this experimental region.’

‘As long as Beijing maintains rigid control over capital-account movements and refuses to adopt internationally accepted practices of the rule of law, it is unlikely that Shenzhen can rival Hong Kong as a global financial hub.’

  • ‘However, what has particularly alarmed highly-educated citizens of the HKSAR is the bald way in which Xi has advocated the de facto merger of Hong Kong with Shenzhen, Macau, and other GBA cities.’
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Early Warning Brief: Beijing Raises Shenzhen’s Status at the Expense of Hong Kong

Early Warning Brief: Beijing Raises Shenzhen’s Status at the Expense of Hong Kong | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

The Jamestown Foundation

Willy Wo-Lap Lam | The Jamestown Foundation

‘Xi declared that reforms in the Shenzhen SEZ would open up a “new development scenario whereby domestic and international dual circulations will complement each other”’

‘In mid-October, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping unveiled reformist rhetoric by pledging to turn the southern city of Shenzhen (Guangdong Province) into a “comprehensive reform pilot project” (综合改革试点), and a “socialism with Chinese characteristics advance demonstration zone” (中国特色社会主义先行示范) for the country’s economic development policies.’

  • ‘Speaking at an October 14 ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Xi called upon the city of 13 million to “expand and accelerate all-round opening up policies,” with “institutional guarantees such as rules and norms.” ’

‘In his October 14 speech, Xi declared that reforms in the Shenzhen SEZ would open up a “new development scenario whereby domestic and international dual circulations will complement each other” (国内国际双循环相互促进).’

  • ‘In this context, “dual circulation” reiterates a theme unveiled following a Politburo meeting in July—referring to the smooth operation of supply chains, production, logistics, sales, and consumption, in terms of both domestic trade and the world market (China Brief, August 14).’

‘At the same time that new reforms are being unveiled, Xi has reminded the bosses of Shenzhen’s predominantly non-state enterprises that they must heed the party’s orders:’

  • ‘ “We must boost party leadership… Party construction must underpin the entire process of comprehensive reform experiments [in the SEZ].” ’
  • ‘The practice of setting up CCP cells in private firms—and giving more decision-making powers to party cadres—was the subject of a major CCP Central Committee policy document issued in mid-September (China Brief, September 28).’
  • ‘This tightening of party control over the private sector has also been followed in Shenzhen, a supposed haven of market forces.’
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'Shenzhen’s Game-Changing Reform'

'Shenzhen’s Game-Changing Reform' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Project Syndicate

Andrew Sheng | Distinguished Fellow of the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong

Xiao Geng | Chairman of the Hong Kong Institution for International Finance 

‘Xi’s tour of the Guangdong province, which culminated in his speech in Shenzhen, was reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1992 southern tour’

‘Early this month, on the 40th anniversary of Shenzhen’s designation as a special economic zone (SEZ), Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a blueprint for building the city into a trade, finance, and technology hub.’

  • ‘Most China-watchers have focused on what this means for Hong Kong, Shanghai, or at most the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau “Greater Bay Area.” ’
  • ‘But such narrow assessments fail to capture the true significance of Xi’s plans for Shenzhen.’

‘In fact, Xi’s tour of the Guangdong province, which culminated in his speech in Shenzhen, was reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1992 southern tour, during which he delivered a series of speeches that formed the foundations of Deng Xiaoping Theory.’

  • ‘In this sense, it may well mark the beginning of a new era of China’s “reform and opening up.” ’

‘It was Xi’s own father, Xi Zhongxun, who, as the Guangdong province’s first Communist Party secretary, played a central role in establishing the initial SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen (with Hainan added later).’

  • ‘At the time, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had pushed China’s economy to the brink of collapse.’
  • ‘With Guangdong facing severe food shortages, its residents were fleeing to Hong Kong.’

‘That is when China decided to create designated export-processing zones, financed largely by investment from Chinese overseas, including in Hong Kong.’

  • ‘Thanks to Hong Kong’s busy port and world-class financial sector, Shenzhen was able to access new ideas, technologies, and resources that could spur entrepreneurial activity.’

‘These experiments with market forces within China’s centrally planned economy were breathtakingly daring.’

  • ‘And they

‘Over the last 40 years, Shenzhen achieved a staggering 20.7% average annual GDP growth rate.’

  • ‘What was once a poor fishing village now has the highest per capita GDP on the mainland, and a total GDP on par with Hong Kong’s at CN¥2.7 trillion ($402 billion).’

‘On the contrary, to sustain progress, an updated approach to reform and opening up is essential.’

  • ‘And Shenzhen – which has performed the best among the first cohort of SEZs – is the ideal place to test that approach.’

‘This is in line with China’s approach to development, which has always been based less on a particular theory or predetermined plan than on a process of experimentation under uncertain conditions.’

  • ‘The process always begins with a hard-nosed appraisal of existing opportunities, threats, barriers, and possible breakthrough points.’

‘Such an appraisal is what produced China’s dual-circulation strategy, which is expected to be central to China’s soon-to-be-unveiled 14th Five-Year Plan, covering the 2021-25 period.’

  • ‘Far from implying that China is “turning inward,” as many have claimed, that strategy promises to improve the balance between openness to global opportunities and reliance on domestic production, distribution, and consumption.’

‘The next step in China’s experimentation process is typically to test new reforms or approaches in a particular region, before implementing successful policies more widely, using a phased, coordinated approach.’

  • ‘That is what is set to happen in Shenzhen.’

‘The experimentation process clearly has top-down direction, but it is managed largely at the local level.’

  • ‘Four days after Xi’s Shenzhen speech, the National Development and Reform Commission announced 40 areas where increased autonomy would be delegated to Shenzhen, in order to facilitate the pilot reforms in market development and economic integration.’

‘For example, Shenzhen will have increased authority over the allocation of capital, land, talent, and intellectual-property rights, and greater power to create new business regulations (including dispute-resolution systems) and incentives for innovation.’

  • ‘It will also have far more space to create internationally compatible rules (such as financial-market regulations) and systems (including education, health care, and social security), without having to await provincial- or central-government approval.’

‘Of course, Shenzhen is not meant to thrive at the expense of the rest of China.’

  • ‘As the city undertakes bold reforms, it should consider not only internal objectives, but also the implications for the rest of the country.’

‘Some have argued that the Shenzhen plan is aimed specifically at eroding Hong Kong’s competitive advantages.’

  • ‘This narrow view is wrong.’

‘The truth is that Shenzhen’s development would create more opportunities for all, by expanding and deepening the regional market.’

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China Policy Debates are Back

Greetings!

In this issue:

1. I just saw my first Chinese bot!

2. China Commemorates the "War to Resist American Aggression and Aid Korea”

  • 'Xi Jinping says China "determined to defeat invaders" in Korean war anniversary speech'
  • 'In Xi’s Homage to Korean War, a Jab at the U.S.' 

3. DEBATE: U.S. Policy Toward China

  • POINT | 'How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression'
  • COUNTERPOINT | 'The Overreach of the China Hawks'

 

Issue: Should the U.S. take a hard line against China or one that is more accommodating?

  • Continually revisiting that question or some form of it allows the U.S. to recalibrate as needed to meet changing circumstances or to integrate new intelligence.

Since the rapid – and pretty startling - bipartisan shift to the view that China is our adversary – period - robust and nuanced discussion has been stifled.

  • No one – especially an elected official - wants to be accused of being soft on China, or worse a Panda Hugger.

But now within a new framework of legitimate U.S. concerns about China, debate is beginning again.

  • Consider an exchange in recent issues of Foreign Affairs.

In his 'How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression,’ Aaron Friedberg of Princeton argues:

  • ‘Deflecting Beijing from its present, revisionist path will naturally require defensive measures.’
  • ‘But better defenses alone will not suffice.’

‘An effective strategy must also have a strong offensive component. The aims of this approach should be twofold:’

  • ‘first, to deny Beijing its immediate objectives, imposing costs, slowing the growth of China’s power and influence, and reducing the threat it can pose to democracies and to an open international system; and’
  • ‘second, by demonstrating the futility of China’s current strategy, to change the calculations of its ruling elite, forcing them to eventually rethink both their foreign and their domestic policies.’

In the next issue of Foreign Affairs a gaggle of luminaries - Michael D. Swaine, Ezra F. Vogel, Paul Heer, J. Stapleton Roy, Rachel Esplin Odell, Mike Mochizuki, Avery Goldstein, and Alice Miller – responded directly in 'The Overreach of the China Hawks.'

  • They counter Friedberg saying:

‘In “An Answer to Aggression,” (September/October 2020), Aaron Friedberg argues that the United States and its allies and partners should use aggressive policies to contain China.’

  • ‘Friedberg repeatedly offers sweeping, unqualified worst-case statements about China’s views, intentions, and actions—playing loose with the facts and exhibiting a lack of understanding of aspects of the Chinese system—to justify zero-sum policy prescriptions.’

‘Coercive “push back” policies alone will not compel Beijing to do the United States’ bidding—as Washington’s Cuba policy demonstrates.’

  • ‘To the contrary, such policies would increase the risk of conflict, strengthen chauvinistic nationalism in China, and reduce the chances that the United States can work with China to deal with urgent common problems.’

‘U.S. policymakers must adopt a more careful and considered approach.’

  • ‘A more realistic and effective approach would eschew demonizing rhetoric and apocalyptic speculation and seek to strike an appropriate balance between deterrence and cooperation, while making common cause with like-minded countries that share U.S. goals.’

And, Dr. Friedberg responds:

  • ‘Perhaps it should come as no surprise in the current climate, but this multiauthored letter reads more like another overwrought political statement than an attempt at reasoned debate on complex issues.

‘Yet the authors seem not to have updated their assessments of the regime’s intentions and capabilities, nor their prescriptions for how best to respond to its actions.’

  • ‘Recent analyses suggest that China’s leaders believe their policies are working and that the tides of history are flowing in their favor.’

‘Achieving a more stable relationship will require first persuading them that they are mistaken.’

  • ‘Attempting to reassure Beijing or to appease its “legitimate . . . concerns” by adopting a purely defensive posture will have the opposite effect, with potentially disastrous consequences.’

This sounds like an example of the exchanges described, perhaps, by Henry Kissinger:

  • The republic of learning and letters works by squabbling—especially bitter squabbling—because the stakes are so small.’

But in this case, the stakes are very high.

  • And for that reason, and even with all the cattiness, that debates such this one are taking place again a very good thing.

As I read these differing contentions about China’s aims and attitudes, I immediately thought of recent articles describing the PRC’s recent commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War or, as the Chinese call it, the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” the only military conflict between China and the United States - so far. And also of Xi Jinping’s barnburner of a speech (now that’s worth reading).

  • The New York Times reports:

‘The anniversary unfolded with a barrage of commemorative events, exhibitions, television documentaries and feature films. They all conveyed the same message:’

  • ‘The Chinese people have stood up to the United States before and, regardless of the costs, they will again.’

The sort of anti-U.S. belligerence displayed throughout the commemoration could bolster Dr. Friedberg’s call for U.S. policy to have ‘a strong offensive component.’

  • But it also could be used by those calling for more U.S. accommodation with China to show that America’s hardline actions against China drove the country to that belligerence.

Untangling issues like these calls for vigorous debate.

  • And, fingers crossed, that seems to be coming back.

Go deeper into these issues - Browse the posts below.

To read the original article, click the title.

Let me know what you think. And please forward the China Macro Reporter to your friends and colleagues.

All the best,

Malcolm 

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Xi Jinping says China ‘determined to defeat invaders’ in Korean war anniversary speech

Xi Jinping says China ‘determined to defeat invaders’ in Korean war anniversary speech | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

South China Morning Post

“Let the world know that the people of China are now united and are not to be trifled with.”

‘President Xi Jinping has said that the Chinese military was determined to defeat invaders and warned against any attempt to divide the nation, in a fiercely nationalistic and pointed speech marking the 70th anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean war against American forces.’

‘Speaking from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Friday, Xi touted what China calls the “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” from 1950 to 1953 – the only military conflict between China and the United States – as a demonstration of China’s military might against American imperialists, saying:’

  • ‘ “Seventy years ago, imperialist invaders brought the flames of war burning to the doorway of the new China.” ’
  • ‘ “The Chinese people understood that you must use the language that invaders can understand – to fight war with war and to stop an invasion with force, earning peace and respect through victory.” ’
  • ‘ “The Chinese people will not create trouble but nor are we afraid of them, and no matter the difficulties or challenges we face, our legs will not shake and our backs will not bend.” ’

‘Xi stressed that “any country and any army, no matter how powerful they used to be” – a clear jab at the US – would see their actions “battered” if they stood against the international community.’

  • ‘He added that China needed to accelerate its military modernisation to build a world-class military, and to ensure that the ruling Communist Party maintained “absolute leadership” over the military.’

‘ “In today’s world, any unilateralism, protectionism, and ideology of extreme self-interest are totally unworkable, and any blackmailing, blockades and extreme pressure are totally unworkable,” he said.’

  • ‘ “Any actions that focus only on oneself and any efforts to engage in hegemony and bullying will simply not work – not only will it not work, but it will be a dead end.” ’

‘The Korean war was the first – and so far only – time Chinese and US forces have engaged in large-scale direct combat.’

  • ‘In the speech, Xi said the US ignored China’s warning 70 years ago to cross the military demarcation line between the two Koreas and send bombers to the northeastern border with China, causing significant fatalities.’
  • ‘He said China at the time was lagging far behind the US in terms of strength and power but had managed to defeat American troops together with North Korea.’

‘The victory was a sign that “the era when Western aggressors can occupy a country by setting up cannons in the east is gone forever”, he said.’

  • ‘ “The experience showed the Chinese people could not be offended, and that they could withstand risk and pressure in front of enemies, he added.’

‘Xi said China would never allow its sovereignty, security and development interests to be undermined.’

  • ‘ “Any act of unilateralism, monopolism and bullying would not work, and would only lead to a dead end.” ’
  • ‘ “Let the world know that the people of China are now united and are not to be trifled with.” ’

‘He also said any attempt to divide China would be dealt with “head-on”, in a veiled warning to independence forces in Taiwan.’

  • ‘ “We would never allow anyone or any force to invade and divide the sacred territory of our motherland,” he said.’

‘Lu Xiang, a specialist on US affairs at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said Xi’s speech was sending a warning to the US, which was in confrontation with China over almost all aspects of their bilateral ties.’

  • ‘ “The decision to fight the US [70 years ago] was a difficult decision when China was a backward nation,” he said.’
  • ‘ “But it sent a message that if the US took China’s warning as bluffing, it would suffer serious consequences.” ’
  • ‘The power gap between China and the US had narrowed and, therefore, the nation’s determination to defend its own security and sovereignty would be stronger, Lu said.’
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In Xi’s Homage to Korean War, a Jab at the U.S. 

In Xi’s Homage to Korean War, a Jab at the U.S.  | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

The New York Times

Steven Lee Myers and Chris Buckley | NYT

‘The anniversary of the Korean War unfolded with a barrage of commemorative events, exhibitions, television documentaries and feature films. They all conveyed the same message: The Chinese people have stood up to the United States before and, regardless of the costs, they will again.’

‘For Mr. Xi and the country’s propagandists, the anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War -  called the “70 years ago this week could hardly have come at a more opportune time.’

  • ‘The country, in their telling, is once again facing an unprovoked assault by a superpower determined to thwart China’s rise.’
  • ‘This time the United States, under President Trump, has targeted China’s trade policy, its technological advances and its territorial ambitions.’

‘The anniversary unfolded with a barrage of commemorative events, exhibitions, television documentaries and feature films. They all conveyed the same message:’

  • ‘The Chinese people have stood up to the United States before and, regardless of the costs, they will again.’

‘The events commemorating the war — long known as the “forgotten war” in the United States — have followed a series of military drills and an outburst of propaganda.

  • ‘Together they have signaled a hardening resolve against the United States and further raised tensions inflamed by the coronavirus pandemic and President Trump’s continuing derision of China.’

‘History in China has long been repurposed to fit political needs, leaving little room for a frank reckoning with the past.’

  • ‘In the last two decades, some Chinese historians quietly challenged the heroic official narrative of Mao’s decision to thrust the country into the Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953.’
  • ‘But that story has long been a pillar of the founding mythology of the People’s Republic of China, and Mr. Xi relived its highlights in his remarks.’

‘Coming barely a year after the country’s founding, the war was a searing and painful test.’

  • ‘When it broke out, China remained at war with the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek that had retreated to Taiwan, and also faced armed resistance to its invasion of Tibet.’

‘Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River to aid the retreating North Korean army on Oct. 19, 1950; six days later, they fought their first battle with the allied troops fighting under a United Nations mandate.’

  • ‘According to China’s official account, which Mr. Xi cited on Friday, 197,000 Chinese died in the war, though historians broadly agree that the actual toll was much higher.’

‘Commemorations of the war have ebbed and flowed in intensity over the decades for reasons having little to do with the war itself.’

‘Mr. Xi also appeared to have a domestic audience in mind.’

  • ‘He and the rest of the party leadership are scheduled to gather next week in a closed-door assembly to discuss China’s priorities for the next five years.’
  • ‘He used Friday’s speech to restate his case for the primacy of the Communist Party leadership, with himself at the core.’

‘It is a theme he has often invoked amid the pandemic, which, despite early missteps, his government has managed to bring under control domestically.’

  • ‘Even the sight of a cadre of hundreds in a crowded hall — all wearing masks — was a striking contrast to bans on gatherings in many countries.’

‘Mr. Xi’s speech had a strikingly hawkish tone, describing at one point the sacrifices of soldiers who had used their bodies as shields against a far superior force.’

  • ‘ “They smashed the myth that the American military was invincible,” he said.’

‘For most in China, the war has become a distant memory. Its remaining veterans are gradually dying off, and Chinese society today is unimaginably transformed from the impoverished China of the 1950s.’

  • ‘The country has not experienced war now since 1979, when it invaded Vietnam and was routed.’

‘Lest the idea of war become an abstraction, the party’s propaganda apparatus has churned out dozens of programs.’

  • ‘A six-part documentary aired each night this week on state television. The nightly news casts have featured not only Mr. Xi’s appearances, as always, but also profiles of soldiers who fought and died.’

‘Film studios have responded to government directives and produced a series of feature films, including an animated movie, called “Salute to Heroes,” that is aimed at younger audiences.’

‘Also having its opening on Friday was a blockbuster about the war starring Wu Jing, the lead actor in the “Wolf Warrior” action film franchise that has given a name to Chinese diplomacy of late.’

  • ‘The film depicts Chinese soldiers keeping a vital river crossing open against relentless American bombardment. Its title in English: “The Sacrifice.” ’

‘Near the end, an American pilot marvels at the tenacity of the soldiers below. He radios back to his commanders that their attacks have failed.’

  • ‘ “There’s nothing we can do to stop them.” ’
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I just saw my first Chinese bot!

I just saw my first Chinese bot! | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

CHINADebate

Malcolm Riddell | CHINADebate

I saw my first Chinese bot on Twitter today – courtesy of the irreverent Relevant Organs [see the post below].

  • If this is an example of the quality of Russian and Chinese bots, I am a lot less concerned about them.

The account is claimed by Amanda Gray.

  • Her tagline: ‘so cannot leave the ship. As he dare not change to man's’
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FRIEDBERG REPLIES

FRIEDBERG REPLIES | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Aaron L. Friedberg | Princeton University

‘Attempting to reassure Beijing or to appease its “legitimate . . . concerns” by adopting a purely defensive posture will have the opposite effect, with potentially disastrous consequences.’

‘I believe that the authors misunderstand the threat China now poses and understate its severity.’

  • ‘That threat is a product of China’s growing material power coupled with the distinctive character of its domestic regime.’

‘Whatever else they may believe, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his colleagues are fervent Leninists.’

  • ‘They regard all politics as a zero-sum, “you die, I live” struggle.
  • ‘They are determined to crush dissent and to retain the Communist Party’s monopoly on political authority at home, whatever the cost, and to overawe potential opponents and demonstrate the superiority of China’s system by transforming it into the world’s strongest state.’

‘As their capabilities and confidence have grown, China’s rulers have started to push back against both the material strength and physical presence of the United States and its democratic allies, as well as the subversive appeal of their liberal democratic ideals.’

  • ‘Beijing seeks to undermine the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and to divide democracies from one another while continuing to penetrate and exploit their societies, economies, and information spheres.’

‘It has become more open in trying to use economic leverage to pressure the United States’ Asian allies and has recently stepped up the use of force and threats of force against several of its democratic neighbors.’

‘At Xi’s direction, the party has intensified its use of covert “united front” political influence operations to try to shape the perceptions and policies of other countries.’

‘Beijing is employing a variety of “sharp power” tactics to expand its influence in developing countries and through them in international organizations.’

  • ‘And it seeks to redefine existing norms in ways that deny the existence of “so-called Western universal values” and assert the moral equivalence of regimes based on unchecked state power.’
  • ‘China may not be trying to force others to adopt its model, but its actions and example are reinforcing trends toward authoritarianism in places where democracy has not yet taken firm root.’

‘The aggressive turn in China’s policies began to emerge during a period in which the United States and other democracies were doing everything possible to accommodate China’s rise.’

  • ‘These troubling tendencies have been clearly evident since at least the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and have grown more obvious since Xi’s rise to power in 2012.’

‘Yet the authors seem not to have updated their assessments of the regime’s intentions and capabilities, nor their prescriptions for how best to respond to its actions.’

‘Recent analyses suggest that China’s leaders believe their policies are working and that the tides of history are flowing in their favor.’

‘Achieving a more stable relationship will require first persuading them that they are mistaken.’

  • ‘Attempting to reassure Beijing or to appease its “legitimate . . . concerns” by adopting a purely defensive posture will have the opposite effect, with potentially disastrous consequences.’
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COUNTERPOINT | 'The Overreach of the China Hawks'

COUNTERPOINT | 'The Overreach of the China Hawks' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Michael D. Swaine, Ezra F. Vogel, Paul Heer, J. Stapleton Roy, Rachel Esplin Odell, Mike Mochizuki, Avery Goldstein, and Alice Miller

‘A more realistic and effective approach would eschew demonizing rhetoric and apocalyptic speculation and seek to strike an appropriate balance between deterrence and cooperation, while making common cause with like-minded countries that share U.S. goals.’

‘In “An Answer to Aggression,” (September/October 2020), Aaron Friedberg argues that the United States and its allies and partners should use aggressive policies to contain China.’

  • ‘Friedberg repeatedly offers sweeping, unqualified worst-case statements about China’s views, intentions, and actions—playing loose with the facts and exhibiting a lack of understanding of aspects of the Chinese system—to justify zero-sum policy prescriptions.’

‘Coercive “push back” policies alone will not compel Beijing to do the United States’ bidding—as Washington’s Cuba policy demonstrates.’

  • ‘To the contrary, such policies would increase the risk of conflict, strengthen chauvinistic nationalism in China, and reduce the chances that the United States can work with China to deal with urgent common problems.’

‘U.S. policymakers must adopt a more careful and considered approach.’

  • ‘The United States must coordinate with allies and partners not only to deter and compete with China when needed but also to incentivize Beijing to cooperate in addressing shared concerns such as global warming and current and future pandemics.’
  • ‘Washington should aim to diminish the likelihood of nuclear war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, a costly arms race, and the spread of terrorism.’
  • ‘It should seek a stable power balance in the Asia-Pacific region that respects the interests of all countries—including those of China.’
  • ‘And it should revise and expand multilateral trade and investment agreements and foster international efforts to better address natural disasters and human rights abuses in all countries.’

‘Such a strategy requires not belligerence and muscle flexing but vigorous and well-funded diplomacy backed by resilient and strategically deployed military forces designed to reinforce stability, not provoke confrontation.’

  • ‘Managing the relationship with Beijing is a long-term project that cannot succeed without domestic revitalization, greater unity of national purpose, and a respect for global opinion.’
  • ‘But above all, U.S. leaders have to take a much more realistic view of the United States’ relationship with China than is now common in Washington and avoid sliding into Friedberg’s black-and-white vision of confrontation.’ 

‘A more realistic and effective approach would eschew demonizing rhetoric and apocalyptic speculation and seek to strike an appropriate balance between deterrence and cooperation, while making common cause with like-minded countries that share U.S. goals.’

‘Chinese leaders, for their part, have made clear that they foresee an extended period of both “struggle and cooperation” with the United States.’

  • ‘From a strategic standpoint, therefore, U.S. policymakers should be willing to settle in for the long haul.’

‘Washington has a global network of allies and partners who look for wise U.S. leadership when it comes to China, an advantage it should not squander.’

‘Friedberg’s bluntly confrontational, zero-sum approach would make it very hard to build this more workable policy.’

  • ‘The United States can do better.’
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POINT | 'How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression'

POINT | 'How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Aaron L. Friedberg | Princeton University

‘If the United States and its allies are able to engage in sustained resistance, China’s leaders may eventually be forced to reconsider their present path.’

‘In the long run, China’s rulers evidently hope that they can divide, discredit, and weaken the democracies, lessening the appeal of their system, co-opting some, isolating others, and leaving the United States at the head of what will be, at best, a diminished and enfeebled coalition.’

‘It is one thing to have such dreams, another to actually fulfill them.’

  • ‘In addition to its impressive strengths, China has large and mounting liabilities, including a slowing economy, a rapidly aging population, and a system of governance that relies on costly coercion rather than the freely given consent of its people.’

‘These liabilities will complicate the regime’s plans and could eventually derail them.’

  • ‘But it would be imprudent to assume that this will happen soon or of its own accord.’

‘Deflecting Beijing from its present, revisionist path will naturally require defensive measures.’

  • ‘In the face of China’s growing strength, the United States and its allies need to bolster their defenses against overt acts of military aggression or coercion.’
  • ‘They must also do more to protect their economies from exploitation and their societies and political systems from penetration and subversion.
  • ‘But better defenses alone will not suffice.’

‘An effective strategy must also have a strong offensive component.’

  • ‘It must be designed to identify and exploit the CCP regime’s vulnerabilities instead of simply responding to its actions or trying to match its strengths.’
  • ‘A purely reactive posture might have been adequate for dealing with a far weaker, nascent rival, but it cannot succeed against an opponent as powerful and aggressive as China has become.’
  • ‘Even as they block Beijing’s attempts to advance toward its goals, the United States and its allies must therefore find ways to regain the initiative.’

‘The aims of this approach should be twofold:’

  • ‘first, to deny Beijing its immediate objectives, imposing costs, slowing the growth of China’s power and influence, and reducing the threat it can pose to democracies and to an open international system; and’
  • ‘second, by demonstrating the futility of China’s current strategy, to change the calculations of its ruling elite, forcing them to eventually rethink both their foreign and their domestic policies.’

‘At present, the United States is not well situated to capitalize on Beijing’s belligerence.’

  • ‘The Trump administration deserves credit for turning U.S. China policy in a more realistic direction.’
  • ‘But for nearly four years, the president has picked fights with the United States’ friends and allies, proved incapable of speaking persuasively about democratic values, and refused to criticize Beijing for its egregious violations of human rights.’

‘All of this has left the United States poorly positioned to lead a coalition in pushing back against China.’

  • ‘Meanwhile, the president’s decision to make China a centerpiece in his reelection campaign, blaming Beijing for all the hardships unleashed by the pandemic, has short-circuited some early efforts at bipartisan cooperation in Congress.’
  • ‘Still, the fact that the Democratic and Republican Parties are now accusing each other of being soft on China and competing to stake out the tougher position suggests that a consensus has begun to take shape.’

‘If the United States and its allies are able to engage in sustained resistance, China’s leaders may eventually be forced to reconsider their present path.’

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How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression

How America Can Push Back Against China's Aggression | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Aaron L. Friedberg | Princeton University

‘If the United States and its allies are able to engage in sustained resistance, China’s leaders may eventually be forced to reconsider their present path.’

‘In the long run, China’s rulers evidently hope that they can divide, discredit, and weaken the democracies, lessening the appeal of their system, co-opting some, isolating others, and leaving the United States at the head of what will be, at best, a diminished and enfeebled coalition.’

‘It is one thing to have such dreams, another to actually fulfill them.’

  • ‘In addition to its impressive strengths, China has large and mounting liabilities, including a slowing economy, a rapidly aging population, and a system of governance that relies on costly coercion rather than the freely given consent of its people.’

‘These liabilities will complicate the regime’s plans and could eventually derail them.’

  • ‘But it would be imprudent to assume that this will happen soon or of its own accord.’

‘Deflecting Beijing from its present, revisionist path will naturally require defensive measures.’

  • ‘In the face of China’s growing strength, the United States and its allies need to bolster their defenses against overt acts of military aggression or coercion.’
  • ‘They must also do more to protect their economies from exploitation and their societies and political systems from penetration and subversion.
  • ‘But better defenses alone will not suffice.’

‘An effective strategy must also have a strong offensive component.’

  • ‘It must be designed to identify and exploit the CCP regime’s vulnerabilities instead of simply responding to its actions or trying to match its strengths.’
  • ‘A purely reactive posture might have been adequate for dealing with a far weaker, nascent rival, but it cannot succeed against an opponent as powerful and aggressive as China has become.’
  • ‘Even as they block Beijing’s attempts to advance toward its goals, the United States and its allies must therefore find ways to regain the initiative.’

‘The aims of this approach should be twofold:’

  • ‘first, to deny Beijingits immediate objectives, imposing costs, slowing the growth of China’s power and influence, and reducing the threat it can pose to democracies and to an open international system; and’
  • ‘second, by demonstrating the futility of China’s current strategy, to change the calculations of its ruling elite, forcing them to eventually rethink both their foreign and their domestic policies.’

‘At present, the United States is not well situated to capitalize on Beijing’s belligerence.’

  • ‘The Trump administration deserves credit for turning U.S. China policy in a more realistic direction.’
  • ‘But for nearly four years, the president has picked fights with the United States’ friends and allies, proved incapable of speaking persuasively about democratic values, and refused to criticize Beijing for its egregious violations of human rights.’

‘All of this has left the United States poorly positioned to lead a coalition in pushing back against China.’

  • ‘Meanwhile, the president’s decision to make China a centerpiece in his reelection campaign, blaming Beijing for all the hardships unleashed by the pandemic, has short-circuited some early efforts at bipartisan cooperation in Congress.’
  • ‘Still, the fact that the Democratic and Republican Parties are now accusing each other of being soft on China and competing to stake out the tougher position suggests that a consensus has begun to take shape.’

‘If the United States and its allies are able to engage in sustained resistance, China’s leaders may eventually be forced to reconsider their present path.’

 
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'The Importance of Being Candid': Remarks by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger 

'The Importance of Being Candid': Remarks by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger  | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

PolicyExchangeUK

Matt Pottinger | Deputy National Security Adviser

‘So it is in a spirit of friendship, reflection, and, yes, candor, that I ask friends in China to research the truth about your government’s policies toward the Uyghur people and other religious minorities.’ 

‘The following is the English-language version of “The Importance of Being Candid,” a speech delivered by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger in Mandarin Chinese from the White House during a video conference hosted by Policy Exchange in London.’

‘Dean Godson [the host] asked me to bust out my Chinese for the sake of higher ratings.’ 

  • ‘Dean knew that a video of an earlier speech I delivered in Mandarin, about China’s May Fourth movement, was viewed more than one million times.’ 
  • ‘Dean may have also known that a subsequent video I recorded in English for the Ronald Reagan Institute was, by contrast, barely noticed by even my own staff.’

‘Delivering these remarks in Mandarin has another benefit.’

  • ‘It allows friends in China to join a conversation that is taking place with increasing regularity around the globe: A conversation about China’s relationship with the rest of the world.’

‘On the foreign policy front, President Trump has ingrained two principles worth sharing here, because they’re designed to preserve our sovereignty, promote stability, and reduce miscalculation.’ 

  • ‘They are reciprocity and candor.’

‘Reciprocity is the straightforward idea that when a country injures your interests, you return the favor.’ 

  • ‘It is eminently reasonable and readily understood, including by would-be aggressors.’ 
  • ‘It’s an inherently defensive approach, rooted in notions of fair play and deterrence.’

‘Candor is the idea that democracies are safest when we speak honestly and publicly about and to our friends, our adversaries, and ourselves.’ 

  • ‘This can take some getting used to.’ 

‘When President Reagan was preparing to give a speech in Berlin, several of his staff tried desperately to get him to remove a phrase they found embarrassing and needlessly provocative.’ 

  • ‘Luckily, President Reagan went with his gut, and delivered the most famous line of his presidency:  “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” ’

‘Some will argue that confrontational rhetoric turns countries into enemies.’ 

  • ‘Public candor actually promotes peace by reducing the space for strategic blunders.’

‘Public candor applies to our internal affairs, too.’ 

  • ‘There can be no double standard.’

‘When Louis Armstrong performed in the Soviet Union as a cultural ambassador of the State Department, he spoke frankly about racial bigotry in the United States.’ 

  • ‘When Reagan famously referred to the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire,” he explored America’s own “legacy of evil”—including anti-Semitism and slavery—in the very same speech.’

‘So it is in a spirit of friendship, reflection, and, yes, candor, that I ask friends in China to research the truth about your government’s policies toward the Uyghur people and other religious minorities.’ 

  • ‘Ask yourselves why the editors of The Economist, in a cover article this week, called those policies “a crime against humanity” and “the most extensive violation in the world today of the principle that individuals have a right to liberty and dignity simply because they are people.” ’

‘As a Marine who spent three combat deployments fighting terrorists, I can tell you that what is taking place in Xinjiang bears no resemblance whatsoever to an ethical counter-terrorism strategy.’ 

  • ‘Such abuses are what the Chinese diplomat P.C. Chang was trying to prevent when he helped draft the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ 
  • ‘There is no credible justification I can find in Chinese philosophy, religion, or moral law for the concentration camps inside your borders.’
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Keep an Eye on Deputy National Security Adviser: Matt Pottinger

Keep an Eye on Deputy National Security Adviser: Matt Pottinger | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

CHINADebate

Malcolm Riddell | CHINADebate

If you don’t know much about Matt Pottinger that seems to be his intention.

The acronym ‘POP’ often comes up in reporting about the China Hawks in the Trump Administration who are now in charge of shaping U.S. policy toward China.

  • The POP are Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, and Deputy National Security Adviser Matt P

If you don’t know much about Matt Pottinger that seems to be his intention.

  • He is a decidedly behind-the-scenes player.
  • Yet his inclusion in the POP suggests his influence.

I have a great deal of respect for Matt.

  • After seven years in China as a journalist for Reuters and the Wall Street Journal, he resigned. And, at age 32, he became a Marine officer.
  • He served three combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and earned the Bronze Star.
  • (You can find out more about Matt in a 2011 profile in The Atlantic.)

Matt also speaks terrific Chinese, and he used that skill to convey U.S. thinking about China directly to the Chinese people in video addresses in Mandarin.

  • (Although you have to wonder, given Chinese censorship, how many Chinese actually heard them.)

In his May 4th speech commemorating the anniversary of the start of the 1919 ‘May 4th’ Movement,’ he wove elements of Chinese history and thought to ask:

  • “As the May Fourth Movement today marks the inaugural year of its second century, what will its ultimate legacy be?” 
  • “It is a question only the Chinese people themselves can answer. The May Fourth Movement belongs to them.”

“Will the movement’s democratic aspirations remain unfulfilled for another century? 

  • “Will its core ideas be deleted or distorted through official censorship and disinformation?” 
  • “Will its champions be slandered as ‘unpatriotic,’ ‘pro-American,’ ‘subversive’?” 
  • “We know the Communist Party will do its best to make it so.”

“So who embodies the May Fourth spirit in China today?” 

  • “To my mind, the heirs of May Fourth are civic-minded citizens who commit small acts of bravery. And sometimes big acts of bravery.” 

His October 23rd speech in Mandarin [highlighted in this issue] spoke again to the Chinese people, saying:

  • “So it is in a spirit of friendship, reflection, and, yes, candor, that I ask friends in China to research the truth about your government’s policies toward the Uyghur people and other religious minorities. 
  • “Ask yourselves why the editors of The Economist, in a cover article this week [also highlighted in this issue], called those policies ‘a crime against humanity’ and ‘the most extensive violation in the world today of the principle that individuals have a right to liberty and dignity simply because they are people.’

(Full disclosure: My Chinese is pretty good, but I couldn’t have written any of Matt’s speeches on my best day. So my envy knows no bounds.)

Although grouped together with China Hawks Pompeo and O’Brien, Matt is different from them.

  • First, he actually knows something about China: the country, the people, the politics.

Second, as Graham Allison of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, who has spoken with Matt about policy, says:

  • “I have found him variously to be smart, insightful, inquisitive and not dogmatic.” 

For all these reasons, I expect Matt to be a force in the debate over U.S. policy toward China for many years to come.

I have wanted to write about Matt for a long time.

  • But other issues won the competition for space.

Now given the trajectory of the presidential race, Matt is likely to be out of a job in January.

  • So before that happens, I wanted to take this opportunity to introduce him and give you a heads up to look for him whenever he leaves his post.

As in his current position, he may be hard to discern.

  • But he will there, working to shape China policy as he sees it.
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'The persecution of the Uyghurs is a crime against humanity' 

'The persecution of the Uyghurs is a crime against humanity'  | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

The Economist

‘Liberal democracies have an obligation to call a gulag a gulag.’

‘The first stories from Xinjiang were hard to believe.’

  • ‘Surely the Chinese government was not running a gulag for Muslims?’
  • ‘Surely Uyghurs were not being branded “extremists” and locked up simply for praying in public or growing long beards?’

‘Yet, as we report in this week’s China section (see article), the evidence of a campaign against the Uyghurs at home and abroad becomes more shocking with each scouring of the satellite evidence, each leak of official documents and each survivor’s pitiful account.’

‘In 2018 the government pivoted from denying the camps’ existence to calling them “vocational education and training centres”—a kindly effort to help backward people gain marketable skills.’

  • ‘The world should instead heed Uyghur victims of China’s coercive indoctrination.’

‘Month after month, inmates say, they are drilled to renounce extremism and put their faith in “Xi Jinping Thought” rather than the Koran.’

  • ‘One told us that guards ask prisoners if there is a God, and beat those who say there is.’
  • ‘And the camps are only part of a vast system of social control.’

‘China’s 12m Uyghurs are a small, disaffected minority.’

  • ‘Their Turkic language is distant from Chinese. They are mostly Muslim. A tiny handful have carried out terrorist attacks, including a bombing in a market in 2014 that left 43 people dead.’

‘No terrorist incidents have occurred since 2017: proof, the government says, that tighter security and anti-extremism classes have made Xinjiang safe again.’

  • ‘That is one way of putting it.’

‘Another is that, rather than catching the violent few, the government has in effect put all Uyghurs into an open-air prison.’

  • ‘The aim appears to be to crush the spirit of an entire people.’

Even those outside the camps have to attend indoctrination sessions.’

  • ‘Any who fail to gush about China’s president risk internment.’
  • ‘Families must watch other families, and report suspicious behaviour.’
  • ‘New evidence suggests that hundreds of thousands of Uyghur children may have been separated from one or both detained parents. Many of these temporary orphans are in boarding schools, where they are punished for speaking their own language.’
  • ‘Party cadres, usually Han Chinese, are stationed in Uyghur homes, a policy known as “becoming kin”.’

‘Rules against having too many children are strictly enforced on Uyghur women; some are sterilised.’

  • ‘Official data show that in two prefectures the Uyghur birth rate fell by more than 60% from 2015 to 2018.’
  • ‘Uyghur women are urged to marry Han Chinese men and rewarded if they do with a flat, a job or even a relative being spared the camps.’

‘The persecution of the Uyghurs is a crime against humanity: it entails the forced transfer of people, the imprisonment of an identifiable group and the disappearance of individuals.’

  • ‘Systematically imposed by a government, it is the most extensive violation in the world today of the principle that individuals have a right to liberty and dignity simply because they are people.’

‘Liberal democracies have an obligation to call a gulag a gulag.’

  • ‘In an age of growing global competition, that is what makes them different.’
  • ‘If they fail to stand up for liberal values they should not be surprised if others do not respect them, either.’ 
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'Lessons from The Trump Administration’s Policy Experiment on China.'

Greetings!

 

In today’s issue:

  1. The Interview | Dr. Larry Wortzel on The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
  2. 'Lessons from The Trump Administration’s Policy Experiment on China'
  3. 'U.S.’s China Hawks Drive Hard-Line Policies After Trump Turns on Beijing'
  4. ‘China and the Rules-Based Order’ 
  • 'An Order Aligned with Chinese Values'
  1. 'China’s Economy After COVID'

I prefer foreign policy initiatives that have clearly-stated objectives, a well-thought-out plan, a capable team, and step-by-step execution (as much as possible given changing circumstances).

  • That’s why in critiquing President Trump’s actions toward China, I have invoked the mantra: What would Reagan do?
  • For me, President Reagan’s engagement with the Soviet Union matched the criteria outlined above, and President’s engagement with China does not.

But after reading Ryan Hass’s excellent 26-page analysis 'Lessons from The Trump Administration’s Policy Experiment on China,’ I see that I have let my biases get in the way of understanding just what the Trump administration has been doing.

  • While the execution, especially by the President himself, has been helter-skelter, larger objectives are nonetheless being pursued.

Mr. Hass relates a conversation he had with a White House official in early 2017:

  • “We’re going to try out an entirely new approach to China policy. We are going to go big.”
  • “And if the experiment doesn’t work, then the next administration can always go back to the old way that things were done.”

As Mr. Hass makes clear there is no going back.

  • ‘The solution is not to rewind the clock to a past policy. In any event, there is no turning back to the pre-2016 status quo.’
  • 'Beijing’s behavior has grown too aggressive, and American public attitudes toward China have hardened too much, for there to be any serious consideration of snapping back to any semblance of a pre-Trump China policy.’

That said, the experiment has created an opportunity:

  • ‘Weshould take advantage of the policy space that the Trump administration has opened to fashion a more effective approach toward China.’

And while ‘the Trump administration’s policy experiment did not succeed in making the American people more secure or prosperous,’ it did set the stage for a new adminstration:

  • ‘…to reimagine how more effectively to use available policy tools to achieve better results vis-à-vis China than has been the case during the experimental period 2017-2020.’

Though not in a very Reagan-esque way, the Trump administration has reshaped and readied the field for an administration to achieve Reagan-esque successes.

 

Also in this issue is my interview with Dr. Larry Wortzel.

  • Among his many achievements, Larry is an eight-term commissioner on and former chair of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

The Commission, created by and reporting to Congress, is one of the bodies shaping U.S. policy toward China.

  • I often advised here that to understand the trajectory of U.S. policy toward China you have to watch Congress as well as executive branch.
  • And to understand Congress’ trajectory, you have to watch the Commission.

The Commission produces an annual report to Congress and, in preparation for that, holds hearings that invite leading China experts to testify.

  • Both the report and the testimonies are terrific resources themselves, making bookmarking the Commission’s website a must.

Larry gives a great explanation of what the Commission does and how it works. He also hints at just how influential it is:

  • ‘For a long time the Commission was probably considered hawkish, and outside the way both Republican and Democratic administrations approached China, but they've shifted to our view.’
  • ‘Today we're in the mainstream.’

Before my attention was diverted by the succession of actions by China and the U.S., the issue that most occupied me was China and the world order?

  • Will China be a participant, working to influence the order to meet its needs?
  • Will China create an alternative and competing order?
  • Will it do both?
  • Or will simply ignore the world order and go about its business?

What you conclude will shape your understanding and analysis of China.

  • And skipping over the issue all together makes any analysis flawed.

That’s why I was especially happy that the Lowy Institute has created a debate of sorts on China and the world order:

  • ‘To interpret and explain these issues, we asked a select group of experts about Beijing’s goals for the international order; the changes it seeks and what compromises China might agree to, especially with the United States.’
  • ‘This Lowy Institute feature presents the experts’ responses to these questions and their reactions to one another’s arguments.’

More than ample points of view from which to draw your own conclusions.

 

Finally, Andy Rothman of Matthews Asia has a new post about China’s economy on his Sinology page.

  • His key conclusion: ‘U.S.-China political tensions shouldn’t disrupt China’s economic recovery.’

That’s good news for China because political tensions with the U.S. aren’t likely to abate regardless of who wins the upcoming presidential election.

Go deeper into these issues - Browse the posts below.

To read the original article, click the title.

Let me know what you think. And please forward the China Macro Reporter to your friends and colleagues.

All the best,

Malcolm

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The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel is an eight-term Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the United States Congress.

_________________________________

Malcolm Riddell: ‘Greetings Larry. You are an eight-term member and former chairman of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.’

  • ‘Would you please tell us about the Commission and its work?’

Larry Wortzel: ‘The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission was put in place by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, which took effect in 2001.’

  • ‘Our job is to report to Congress on China issues.’

‘We are tasked to look at:’

  • ‘China's record on the proliferation of weapons and weapons of mass destruction;
  • ‘the transfer of US production capability to China,’
  • ‘China's demands on energy resources, and its effect on the US economy and security;
  • foreign investment in the US and US investment in China, and its effect on US economy and security broadly,’
  • ‘military plans and affairs by China’
  • ‘cyber and China's cyber activities,’
  • ‘China's WTO
  • ‘free speech - not human rights, but free speech and repression of free speech - and
  • ‘lately we've been asked to look at issues pertaining to food, drugs, and private citizen data.’

 Malcolm: ‘Now who tasked the Commission to look at these issues and advise Congress?

Larry: ‘These are from a legislative mandate.’

  • ‘They are actually built into the legislation, which has been amended, I think, three times since 2000.’

‘We also consult with members and caucuses.’

  • ‘The Taiwan Caucus in the House is very active.’
  • ‘The China caucus is large, and primarily is really an anti-China caucus. They're pretty hawkish.’
  • ‘The China Working Group, they're the big business guys, Caterpillar, Boeing, Microsoft, but we meet with their members and we meet with the leaders once in a while.’

‘For a long time the Commission was probably considered hawkish, and outside the way both Republican and Democratic administrations approach China, but they've shifted to our view.’

  • ‘Today we're in the mainstream.’

Malcolm: ‘What does the Commission provide to Congress?’

Larry: ‘Our product is an annual report to Congress, which we generally do in November or December.’

  • ‘In preparation for it, we will run six to seven hearings that very much look like a congressional hearing. We do them over on the Hill.’

Malcolm: ‘I should say that, in addition to your annual report, your hearings are very valuable.’

Larry: ‘Thank you. Here’s why I think they're so good.’

  • ‘If two commissioners are assigned or volunteer for a hearing topic, they get to shape it.’

‘And I'll just tell you how I do it because everybody does it different.’

  • ‘I will tell the staff, "Here's some people I know, but let's try and find some new blood if they're out there.” ’
  • ‘But don't just send me anybody unless you can send me something cogent on the topic they've written.’

‘If you can find that person on the web, some speaking opportunity or press engagement, check his or her speaking style.’

  • ‘If you testify in front of Congress, you get five minutes. You better be able to sum up what you have to say in five minutes.’
  • ‘We give people seven minutes, but a college professor that talks for 50 is going to fail every time.’

‘We always try to have competing opinions on an issue.’

  • ‘And we never try and stack the deck.’

Malcolm: ‘You do invite terrific China experts to participate in those hearings. I certainly rely on their testimony, both written and oral.’

Larry: ‘Right. And we get their testimony transcribed and publish it on the Commission’s website.’

  • ‘We also go back to the experts with follow-on questions and get some great answers.’

Malcolm: ‘Does the Commission really have an impact on Congressional activities regarding China?’

Larry: ‘I recently had one of the staff correlate the Commission’s recommendations in the 2018 and 2019 annual reports with bills that were passed by the House and Senate, and resolutions.’

  • ‘In the Senate 28 bills mention or are based on our annual report, and nine bills in the House - all co-sponsored.’
  • In addition there were two Senate resolutions, and 13 House resolutions.’

Malcolm: ‘How did the Commission come into existence?’

Larry: ‘As I mentioned, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission was put in place by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, which took effect in 2001.’

  • ‘It was tied to granting China “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” status.’

‘Prior to that, there was an annual review of everything that had to do with China by Congress in order to allow trade to go on.’

  • ‘And I guess there were enough constituents around the country and members of Congress who were very skeptical of getting rid of annual reviews so that Congress created two commissions, each a different charter or legislative mandate, and a different structure.’

‘The other commission is the US-China Executive Congressional Commission.’

  • ‘That Commission is made up primarily congressmen with a permanent staff and a few people out of the executive branch.’
  • ‘Its mandate is human rights and religious freedom for the most part.’

‘And ours, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, gets a lot more complicated.

  • ‘First, we're genuinely bipartisan and bicameral.’

‘There are 12 commissioners.’

  • ‘Three each appointed by the Speaker of the House and the House Minority Leader, the House, or the Senate Majority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader.’
  • ‘Those appointments are with the advice and consent of foreign relations or foreign affairs, intel, and armed services committees.’

‘One of the unique things is we elect our chairman and a vice chairman, and we switch parties every year.’

  • ‘So one year we have a Republican chairman and the next year it will be a Democratic chairman.’
  • ‘Sometimes it's by a secret vote. Sometimes it's just by acclaim if we're happy. We elect our own.’

‘We really work closely together. We really function in a bipartisan way. We have never had partisan battles.’

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'U.S.’s China Hawks Drive Hard-Line Policies After Trump Turns on Beijing'

'U.S.’s China Hawks Drive Hard-Line Policies After Trump Turns on Beijing' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

The Wall Street Journal

“The National Security Council said, ‘Give us your wish list of ways to f— with China.’ ”

‘Since President Trump was inaugurated, many members of his national security team have been itching to confront a China they view as the greatest threat to the U.S.’

  • ‘For three years their biggest roadblock, say current and former officials, has been a president who didn’t share their views and whose highest priority was negotiating a trade deal with Beijing.’

‘ “The National Security Council said, ‘Give us your wish list of ways to f— with China,’ ” said one former national security official, recalling the early days of the administration.’

  • ‘Proposals, ranging from stronger relations with Taiwan—which Beijing considers to be a breakaway province—to halting the global advance of Chinese telecommunications companies, saw little meaningful action.’

‘No longer. Since March, Mr. Trump has approved a head-spinning series of actions to confront China.’

‘Three big changes account for the administration’s shift, according to the current and former officials in Washington:’

  • ‘After a limited trade deal with Beijing was secured in January, Mr. Trump’s political calculations changed and he now sees a tougher China policy as good for his reelection campaign.’
  • ‘Different and harder-line China advisers to the president came to prominence this year after the coronavirus pandemic emerged out of China.’
  • ‘The Chinese government’s assertive actions in Hong Kong and elsewhere incensed administration officials and Congress.’

‘There are limits to the administration’s offensive, particularly on actions that could rock the global economy or hurt Mr. Trump’s re-election prospects.’

  • ‘The White House quickly scotched proposals to delink the U.S. dollar from the Hong Kong dollar or cut off a big Chinese bank from the international monetary system.’
  • ‘A proposed ban on imports of cotton from Xinjiang was watered down after officials at the Treasury and Agriculture departments and the trade representative’s office warned it would damage American apparel makers and other importers.’
  • ‘After the president said he would ban the short-video app, TikTok lobbyists warned the Trump campaign that it is popular with teens, including many of voting age who live in battleground states.’

‘The confrontation is unlikely to de-escalate, no matter who wins the presidential election.’

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Lessons from the Trump administration’s policy experiment on China

Lessons from the Trump administration’s policy experiment on China | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Brookings

Ryan Haas | Brookings

‘We should take advantage of the policy space that the Trump administration has opened to fashion a more effective approach toward China.’

‘The Trump administration succeeded during the period 2017-2020 in knocking China off balance and in providing a clear break with the past conduct of U.S.-China relations.’

  • ‘Propelled by an electoral victory and a conviction that previous American policy on China had failed, the Trump administration ushered in a significant shift in America’s approach toward China upon entering office.’

‘This policy shift was built upon judgments that China’s gains in overall national power came at America’s expense, and unless China was stopped or slowed, it could eclipse the United States and impose its own vision and values on the international system.’

  • ‘The Trump administration’s policy experiment on China sought to slow China’s progress and pressure China’s leaders to become more responsive to American priorities and concerns about its behavior.’

‘The Trump administration’s policy experiment did not succeed, however, in making the American people more secure or prosperous.’

  • ‘China has grown less restrained in pursuit of its ambitions. The more that Beijing concluded that the Trump administration was locked in an approach of instinctual hostility irrespective of what China did or did not do, the less restrained it became in its conduct at home and abroad.’
  • ‘Within the U.S.-China relationship, areas of confrontation have intensified, areas of cooperation have vanished, and the capacity of both countries to solve problems or manage competing interests has atrophied. If anything, China grew less responsive to American concerns during this period.’

‘Even so, the solution is not to rewind the clock to a past policy. In any event, there is no turning back to the pre-2016 status quo.’

  • Beijing’s behavior has grown too aggressive, and American public attitudes toward China have hardened too much, for there to be any serious consideration of snapping back to any semblance of a pre-Trump China policy.’

‘Instead we should take advantage of the policy space that the Trump administration has opened to fashion a more effective approach toward China.’

‘Thus, the challenge awaiting the next administration is not to try to rewind the clock, but rather to reimagine how more effectively to use available policy tools to achieve better results vis-à-vis China than has been the case during the experimental period 2017-2020.’

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'Strategic Ambiguity': Korea, Taiwan, & Deterence

Greetings!

In today’s issue:

China's Perception of America & How China Is Acting on That Perception

  • Part 1 | 'China Thinks America Is Losing': Chinese Perceptions
  • Part 2 | 'China Thinks America Is Losing': China's Actions

'Strategic Ambiguity': The Korean War, Taiwan, & The Lessons of Deterrence

  • ‘Taiwan Envoy Hsiao Bi-Khim Hopes For ‘Clarity’ on U.S. Protection from China’ 
  • 'The Korean War’s Lesson for Taiwan'
  • A Look Back To 1952 | 'Korea in Perspective'

'The US is Trying to Use Export Controls to Restrict Huawei’s Access to Semiconductors'

‘Weak Spots in China’s Economic Recovery’

 

Readers know that I support the U.S.’s abandoning its decades-old policy of not saying whether or not it would defend Taiwan against an invasion by China. That is, ‘Strategic Ambiguity.’

  • But they also know that I realize that that change comes with the considerable risk of provoking the Chinese attack the policy seeks to prevent.

By supporting the policy change, I find myself in the comfortable company of Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

  • And, I find myself in the uncomfortable company (for the first time I recall) of Neo-Con Paul Wolfowitz (who aided in persuading President George W. Bush that taking our eye off Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in favor of invading Iraq was a good idea).

But Mr. Wolfowitz has written a useful WSJ op-ed calling for a declaration of U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

  • His analogy is to the Korean War.

‘A failure of resolve can invite catastrophe.’

  • ‘The Korean War was preventable if the U.S. had made clear beforehand that it would forcefully oppose North Korean aggression.’

‘Before the invasion, U.S. political and military leaders didn’t want to defend South Korea and considered an invasion unlikely.’

  • ‘But a surprise attack by seven well-equipped North Korean divisions advancing rapidly down the peninsula changed both the strategic and political calculus.’

Mark Twain famously said, ‘History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.’

  • The circumstances surrounding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are certainly different from those of the Soviet- and Chinese-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea.

But as Mr. Wolfowitz argues the preventative action may be the same:

  • ‘Deterrence rests on a paradox:’
  • ‘The best way to prevent war is to threaten war.’

And if all this seems a little arcanequibbling, consider also Mr. Wolfowitz’s conclusion:

  • ‘A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would present the greatest threat to global peace in a generation.’

This is why the U.S. must get its answers to the questions of clarity and, equally important, how much clarity (there are degrees the U.S. could choose from) right.

Complementing Mr. Wolfowitz’s comments is a ‘look back’ to 1952 to an analysis of why the U.S. had to defend South Korea. This by Adlai Stevenson, governor of Illinois, U.S. Delegate to the UN, and two-time Democratic presidential candidate. He writes:

  • ‘The lesson of Korea may be of historic importance.’
  • ‘What would have happened if the United States and the United Nations had ignored the Korean aggression?’

Substitute China for the Soviet Union, and Taiwan for Korea, and we see the challenges and debate about responses to those challenges haven’t changed all that much.

Opening the issue of the most important analyses – a must read – I’ve seen explaining the Chinese perception of the U.S. and the actions China is taking based on those perceptions: ‘China Thinks American is Losing’ by Julian Gewirtz. He writes:

  • ‘Chinese leaders and policymakers have believed for decades that U.S. power is waning and that the United States seeks to impede China’s rise.’
  • ‘These ideas shaped the worldview of Chinese President Xi Jinping.’

‘Trump has turned what Beijing perceived as a long-term risk into an immediate crisis that demands the urgent mobilization of the Chinese system.’

  • ‘The Trump administration has sought to weaken the grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on society, force the liberalization of the state-dominated Chinese economic system, and block China’s drive to technological supremacy.’
  • ‘Nearly four years into this gambit, however, Trump’s policies appear to have produced the opposite result in each domain.’

And according to Mr. Gewirtz these perceptions and actions won’t change under President Biden.

Also today is 'The US is Trying to Use Export Controls to Restrict Huawei’s Access to Semiconductors' by PIIE’s Chad Bown.

  • If you’re having as much trouble as I am understanding the ins and outs of just how the U.S. is working to starve Huawei and probably China itself of semiconductors, this will explain it.

Mr. Bown has constructed a chart that outlines the flows related to semiconductor supply chains.

  • And, yes, it is a complicated chart, but it’s a complicated issue. Nonetheless, well worth a few minutes to track through each channel and how the U.S. is blocking it.

 

Finally we have another update from CreditSuisse on China’s economic recovery.

  • In sum:

‘Chinese industrial production momentum has declined from an extremely high level.’

  • ‘Industrial production growth should remain positive as the labor market heals and business confidence improves.’
  • ‘However, policy stimulus has started to fade, and will weigh on growth in the next quarter.’
  • ‘Growth could reaccelerate powerfully once vaccines are widely available, possibly in the spring.’

Go deeper into these issues - Browse the posts below.

To read the original article, click the title.

Let me know what you think. And please forward the China Macro Reporter to your friends and colleagues.

All the best,

Malcolm

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Taiwan envoy Hsiao Bi-khim hopes for ‘clarity’ on U.S. protection from China 

Taiwan envoy Hsiao Bi-khim hopes for ‘clarity’ on U.S. protection from China  | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan's de facto ambassador to the United States

The Washington Post

“We need some degree of clarity,”

‘The U.S.-Taiwan security relationship has been purposely ambiguous for four decades.’ 

  • ‘But amid increasing Chinese threats of invasion, America’s commitment to Taiwan needs to be clearer, the island’s de facto ambassador to the United States said this week.’
  • ‘ “We need some degree of clarity,” Hsiao Bi-khim, an American-educated lawmaker who became representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington this summer, told Today’s WorldView.’

‘The comments come amid soaring tensions between Taiwan and China.’

  • ‘This weekend, China aired footage of a military exercise simulating an invasion of Taiwan, as well as a purported confession from a Taiwanese businessman Beijing is holding on spying charges.’

‘Taiwan does not believe China is preparing for a “full-scale military attack,” Hsiao said.’

  • ‘But there is “a risk of accident or miscalculation,” and there needs to be a clear “position that military force is not tolerated and that there are multiple stakeholders in the region that want to jointly assure stability and peace.” ’

‘ ‘When it comes to the thorny question of whether the United States would intervene if China attacked Taiwan, the Trump administration has followed its predecessors in keeping to a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” refusing to directly answer the question. The initial logic behind the tactic was simple.’

  • ‘Ambiguity not only kept China guessing, but it also stopped Taiwan from making potentially provocative moves.’

‘However, with tensions rising again, calls for change appear to be growing inside and outside the White House. In an article for Foreign Affairs last month, Richard Haass and David Sacks argued it was time for a concrete U.S.-Taiwan security pact.’

  • ‘ “The United States should adopt a position of strategic clarity, making explicit that it would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan,” Haass and Sacks wrote.’

‘In 2001, Biden wrote an opinion piece for The Washington Post defending strategic ambiguity.’

  • ‘ “As a matter of diplomacy, there is a huge difference between reserving the right to use force and obligating ourselves, a priori, to come to the defense of Taiwan,” he argued.’

‘A lot has changed in 20 years:’

  • ‘Taiwan has proved its democratic ethos, while U.S. concern about a Taiwan-China conflict has grown.’

‘Michèle Flournoy, speculated to be in the running for Biden’s defense secretary, has written of the need for new military capabilities to deter China from attacking Taiwan.

  • ‘But Biden has offered few hints of what his Taiwan policy would look like.’

‘Calls for clarity seem to be a shift for Taiwan.’ 

  • ‘ “As far as I know, prior administrations in Taiwan have not asked for a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan,” Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who has argued against a change in policy, wrote in an email.’
  • ‘ “I believe that Taiwan president Tsai recognizes that such a shift in U.S. policy could provoke a crisis with China, and therefore would not welcome it,” Glaser continued.’
  • ‘ “That said, if the U.S. consulted the Tsai administration, it would trigger a debate about whether such an offer would ever come again and whether the risks were acceptable.” ’

‘In Taiwan, the subject of strategic ambiguity is debated with considerable nuance, Hsiao explained, with disagreement about “what degree of clarity” is in Taiwan’s interest.’

  • ‘But she rejected the idea that Taiwan could be pushed by more hawkish voices in Washington.’
  • ‘ “I have not considered at all the possibility of too much support for Taiwan,” she said.’
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Part 2 | 'China Thinks America is Losing'

Foreign Affairs

Julian Gewirtz | Council on Foreign Relations

‘Nearly four years into this gambit, however, Trump’s policies appear to have produced the opposite result in each domain.’

‘Trump has turned what Beijing perceived as a long-term risk into an immediate crisis that demands the urgent mobilization of the Chinese system.’

  • ‘The Trump administration has sought to weaken the grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on society, force the liberalizationof the state-dominated Chinese economic system, and block China’s drive to technological supremacy.’
  • ‘Nearly four years into this gambit, however, Trump’s policies appear to have produced the opposite result in each domain.’

‘With such perceptions entrenched, it should come as no surprise that China has reacted in ways that are leading to further conflict between the already divergent U.S. and Chinese systems.’

  • ‘Since Xi’s ascent, China’s ever more authoritarian and domineering turn has alarmed governments around the world.’
  • ‘In 2018, Xi removed term limitson his office.’
  • ‘Under his watch, the CCP has more openly embraced its illiberal identity, pairing repression at home—most gruesomely in Xinjiang, where internment camps hold more than one million Uighurs and members of other minority ethnic groups—with loud criticism of democracies abroad.’

‘Despite U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s call to “engage and empower the Chinese people” against the CCP—an appeal widely interpreted in China as a bid for regime change—the party’s hold over society remains strong.’

  • ‘It rolled out new ideological and political campaigns this past summer.’
  • ‘The clampdown that accompanied China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has further bolstered Beijing’s surveillance and social control systems.’

‘Some top U.S. officials have maintained that the goal of Trump’s policy is to force the liberalization of China’s state-dominated economic system, but from the outset of the trade war in 2018, the Chinese government judged that Trump’s goals were mercantilist—he cared only about getting a so-called good deal for the United States.’

  • ‘In response, China’s rulers have redoubled their reliance on the state sector to deal with the instability resulting from conflict with the United States.’

‘Far from curbing China’s push for technological supremacy, Trump’s actions have encouraged its leaders to accelerate their drive to reduce their country’s dependence on the United States.’

  • ‘After Xi came to power, he made it a priority to address the dangers of interdependence, including through the “Made in China 2025” initiative, which aims to make China 70 percent self-sufficient in ten core technologies by the year 2025.’

‘Beginning this past spring, he unveiled an agenda for the economy that aims to reorient China’s economic development inward, relying much more on China’s enormous domestic market and less on the “more unstable and uncertain world.” ’

  • ‘Fostering domestic demand has long been a talking point of Chinese leaders, but Xi has pledged to make achieving greater domestic consumption a centerpiece of the upcoming five-year plan for 2021–25.’
  • ‘This shift is clearly driven by the assumption that the United States will continue working against China.’

‘He also wants China to strengthen and diversify its ties to other economies around the world, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, an international network of infrastructure projects that aims to increase China’s geopolitical influence.’

  • ‘China is not deglobalizing as much as it is de-Americanizing.’ 

‘China’s conviction that the United States is a diminishing and hostile power has emboldened its leaders to pursue long-standing objectives with new vigor.’

  • ‘Their view of U.S. decline makes them see fewer risks in taking highly aggressive positions, and their sense of U.S. hostility, among other factors, increases their willingness to incur international opprobrium:’
    • ‘imposing a new national security law on Hong Kong; committing atrocities in Xinjiang; bullying Australia, India, and the Philippines; threatening Taiwan; forging new partnerships with Iran and Russia; and letting Chinese diplomats spread conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19.’

‘A world in which China truly becomes self-reliant is a world in which the United States has much less leverage over China than it does at present.’

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'China Thinks America is Losing'

'China Thinks America is Losing' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Julian Gewirtz | Council On Foreign Relations

“The wolf is coming.”

‘Chinese leaders and policymakers have believed for decades that U.S. power is waning and that the United States seeks to impede China’s rise.

  • ‘Mao Zedong was fond of predicting the decline of the capitalist world led by the United States, comparing it to “a dying person who is sinking fast.”
  • ‘He regularly attacked Western attempts to subvert China’s communist revolution, denouncing“reactionaries trying to hold back the wheel of history.”
  • ‘These ideas outlived Mao, although they were shaken as the CCP embraced market reforms and as the United States emerged as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

‘But the 2008 financial crisis, which left China relatively unscathed, caused the country’s leaders to wonder whether the ruinous decline of capitalism that Mao had predicted had in fact arrived.

  • ‘And with their Marxist-inflected view of historical forces, they expected that this prospect would lead, as night follows day, to the flailing of Mao’s hopeless “reactionaries”—American leaders who would try in vain to hold China down. 

‘These ideas shaped the worldview of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

  • ‘When he came to power in 2012, he spoke of historical patterns of conflict between rising and fading hegemonic powers, warned about  the U.S. role in hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union
  • ‘But Xi and his lieutenants were initially more focused on addressing the political and ideological fragility of the system they inherited; they expected the decay of the United Statesto be gradual.

‘Many Chinese elites now think that Trump’s presidency has pushed that slow process into a new phase of sharp and irreversible deterioration.

  • ‘They took measure of the president’s withdrawal from international agreements and institutions and his disdain for traditional alliances.
  • ‘They saw how U.S. domestic policies were exacerbating inequality and polarization, keeping out immigrants, and cutting federal funding for research and development.
  • ‘These beliefs have become a central premise of China’s evolving strategy toward the United States.

‘CCP leaders connect this rapid American decline to intensified U.S. efforts to contain China.

  • ‘The United States under Trump has gone from being a latent, long-term menace to the source of concerted efforts to, in the favored phrase of Chinese officialdom, “comprehensively suppress” China.

‘Trump’s actions and rhetoric have solidified Beijing’s assessment that there is now a durable American effort underway to quickly suppress China.

  • ‘Chinese leaders see that effort as bipartisan, too, with near-unanimous congressional votes on legislation related to China and criticisms of China coming from prominent Democrats, such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. 

An editorial from this past July in the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times stated, “China must accept the reality that America’s attitude toward China has fundamentally changed.”

  • The Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, declared in August that the United States is “a far cry from the major power it used to be,” with its leaders bent on “working to suppress China because they fear China’s growth.”
  • ‘These ideas are remarkably widespread in the statements of Chinese officials and experts, the pages of CCP magazines and newspapers, and across Chinese social media. 

‘ Chinese leaders have long thought that this confrontation might arrive someday, but it has come much quicker than they expected.

  • ‘ “People in the United States and China have for years said the wolf is coming, the wolf is coming, but the wolf hasn’t come,” Shi Yinhong, a leading international relations scholar, told The New York Times.
  • ‘ “This time, the wolf is coming.”
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'The US is trying to use export controls to restrict Huawei’s access to semiconductors'

'The US is trying to use export controls to restrict Huawei’s access to semiconductors' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

Chad Bown | PIIE

‘Foreign-located firms were presented with a choice: continue to do business with Huawei and lose access to American-made tools or stop selling to Huawei and continue to buy American equipment.’

‘The Trump administration has implemented a series of export controls targeting Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei.’

  • ‘The measures, designed to protect US national security interests, attempt to cut off Huawei’s access to semiconductors, the tiny chips necessary to produce the company’s telecommunications hardware for 5G networks.’

‘Global semiconductor supply chains are long, but four important parts stand out—semiconductor manufacturing equipment, software, the design process, and manufacturing the chips. ‘

  • ‘Often, these parts are all done by different companies in different countries.’

‘In 2019, the US Department of Commerce added Huawei to its “Entity List,” prohibiting American firms from selling goods and services to Huawei and its subsidiary, HiSilicon, without a license.’

  • ‘But the restrictions failed to disrupt Huawei’s access to semiconductor supplies as the chips were still available from manufacturers outside the United States.’

‘To prevent Huawei from circumnavigating the 2019 export restrictions, the Trump administration implemented new curbs in 2020 that prevented American manufacturers of equipment used to produce semiconductors from selling to companies abroad that wanted to sell chips to Huawei.’

  • ‘Foreign-located firms were presented with a choice: continue to do business with Huawei and lose access to American-made tools or stop selling to Huawei and continue to buy American equipment.’

‘This PIIE Chart was adapted from Chad P. Bown’s blog post, “How Trump’s export curbs on semiconductors and equipment hurt the US technology sector.”

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A Look Back to 1952 | 'Korea in Perspective'

A Look Back to 1952 | 'Korea in Perspective' | ANALYSIS | Scoop.it

Foreign Affairs

Adlai Stevenson | Governor of Illinois. U.S. Delegate at the UN, & two-time Democratic presidential candidate

‘The lesson of Korea may be of historic importance. What would have happened if the United States and the United Nations had ignored the Korean aggression?’

Substitute China for the Soviet Union, and Taiwan for Korea, and we see that the challenges and debate about responses to them haven’t changed all that much.

‘When North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, with the full support of Peking and Moscow, most of us knew what was at stake.’

  • ‘One of the men who took part in the long, anxious meeting at Blair House gave the simplest explanation of the decision: "This attack on South Korea is like Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland." ’
  • ‘Historians have for years commented on the tragic mistake of France in not ordering the instant mobilization of the French Army when Hitler's troops started marching--and on the shortsightedness of the British and others who failed to urge and support such action.’

‘An American columnist pointed out in June 1950 that President Truman's decision, taken with the virtually unanimous support of the American people and their representatives in Congress, recalled the words of former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson following what he termed "the tragedy of timidity" in the Far Eastern crisis of the early thirties:’

  • ‘ "I broke out and said," wrote Mr. Stimson, "that I was living in a world where all my troubles came from the same thing . . . where we are constantly shut in by the timidity of governments . . . and I said that the time had come when somebody has got to show some guts." ’

‘What would have happened if the United States and the United Nations had ignored the Korean aggression? I can venture a guess.’

  • ‘Our friends throughout Asia and in the Pacific would with perfect reason have doubted our intention to resist Soviet design elsewhere in that area, and they would of necessity have taken the path of appeasement.’
  • ‘Disillusionment would also have swept Western Europe at this impressive demonstration of Soviet-satellite power and of American indecision in the face of a direct challenge.’
  • ‘Then would not the Soviet Union, having challenged us successfully in Korea, have followed that challenge with another? And still another? Munich would follow Munich.’

‘Our vacillation would have paralyzed our will and worked havoc in the community of like-minded nations.’

  • ‘Then when we did succeed in pulling ourselves together we would have found it too late to organize a common front with our friends.’

‘Meanwhile, some of the positive gains of our policy thus far may properly be noted.’ [Only the third point is presented here]

 

‘Third, the Soviet Union now knows that the path of conquest is mortally dangerous.’

  • ‘The Korean aggression very likely was planned as merely the first of a series of military actions--initially by satellites, finally to be undertaken by the Soviet Union itself.’
  • ‘If so, the lesson of Korea may be of historic importance.’

‘Speculation about possible adjustments in the thinking of the men in the Kremlin must be cautious.’

  • ‘We dare not tie our policies to any one assumption regarding Soviet intentions. Whatever those intentions are, however, the Soviet miscalculation in Korea will make them harder of fulfillment.’

‘The burden of my argument, then, based on the meaning of our experience in Korea as I see it, is that we have made historic progress toward the establishment of a viable system of collective security.’

‘What is incontrovertible, I think, is that America needs and wants allies. I think most Americans know this.’

  • ‘I think we believe that the redress in the balance of power in the world must be completed, and quickly.’
  • ‘I think we believe that the great experiment in collective security on which we embarked in 1945 is still in the long run our best chance for peace.’
  • ‘I think we believe that international coöperation is more than elocution.’

‘In short, I think most of us have convictions about the position of the United States in the world today and accept the risks and responsibilities inherent in that position.’

  • ‘The nature of the American decision was shown--is shown--in Korea.’

‘Shall we retreat from that decision? Shall we go it alone? Or shall we go forward with allies?’

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